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The Texas Supreme Court recently rendered a decision favorable to Craig, Terrill, Hale, and Grantham, LLP’s client, Timpte Industries, Inc. in Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009). Robert (Bob) Craig and Leonard (Bud) Grossman represented Timpte in the trial court and Gary Bellair handled proceedings in the intermediate appellate and supreme court. Finding No Defect of Product Design or the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009)
Robert Gish, an experienced trucker, brought suit after falling from the top-rail of a grain-hopper trailer designed by Timpte Industries. The suit alleged the trailer was unreasonably dangerous because of its defective design. The trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment in Timpte’s favor, but the court of appeals reversed. The supreme court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court; holding (1) Timpte’s motion afforded fair notice of its grounds for summary judgment; and (2) no evidence showed the design defects alleged by Gish rendered the trailer unreasonably dangerous. Gish was loading fertilizer into an open-top, grain-hopper trailer that Timpte designed and manufactured when he encountered problems with a downspout attached to the fertilizer plant. To facilitate repairing the downspout, Gish climbed atop the trailer. While Gish was on the obviously narrow and slippery top rail of the trailer, a gust of wind caused him to fall. Gish sustained serious injuries, which his lawsuit attributed to design defects that made the trailer unreasonably dangerous. Essentially, Gish complained that design defects failed to prevent him from climbing atop the trailer and once atop, failed to protect him from the risk of falling. Specifically, Gish alleged two design defects made the trailer unreasonably dangerous: (1) the top two rungs of ladders mounted on the trailer allowed unnecessary access to the top of the trailer, and (2) the top rail of the trailer was too narrow and slippery. In response to Gish’s claims, Timpte filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Among the grounds challenged was the existence of the evidence necessary to show that its trailer was either unreasonably dangerous or the producing cause of Gish’s injury. The trial court granted the summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed on all but one ground — holding “reasonable factfinders could disagree as to whether the trailer’s design was both unreasonably dangerous and a cause of Gish’s fall.” Both parties raised an issue in proceedings before the Texas Supreme Court. Gish raised a procedural issue which contended the trial court erred in rendering its judgment because Timpte’s motion for summary judgment presented no ground questioning the existence of evidence of a defect rendering the product unreasonably dangerous; whereas Timpte questioned the existence of evidence of a design defect that posed an unreasonable danger. In addressing Gish’s contention, the court applied the “fair notice” pleading requirements of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 45(b) and 47(a). Application began with the court’s determination that Timpte’s motion “unambiguously set out … Timpte’s belief that there was no evidence that its trailer was either unreasonably dangerous or the producing cause of Gish’s injury.” The court cautioned that such a motion may be insufficient to give fair notice in a case involving complicated design-defect issues, but rejected Gish’s contention because the record revealed no confusion; Gish’s thorough response indicated his understanding of Timpte’s motion. Absent evidence of any confusion, the court concluded that Timpte’s motion “was not the type of ‘conclusory motion’ … barred by Rule 166a(i).” Turning from the procedural issue to the merits, the court noted a determination of whether a design defect renders a product unreasonably dangerous necessitates a risk-utility analysis of the following factors: (1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (4) the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (5) the expectations of the ordinary consumer. The court further noted the obviousness of a claimed defect is “an important” and potentially decisive consideration in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, but obviousness is not ordinarily determinative because risk-utility analysis encourages manufacturers to reach an optimum level of safety in designing their products. The court concluded the obvious nature of the defects alleged by Gish was important but not determinative. Finding the slight risk of injury from the ladder “stems only from the risk that a user will ignore both Timpte’s warnings and open and obvious dangers,” the court held the inclusion of the top two rungs of the ladder was not a design defect that rendered the trailer unreasonably dangerous. The court similarly concluded the risk-utility factors favored Timpte because the risk of falling while trying to balance on a narrow strip of extruded aluminum nearly ten feet above the ground is an obvious risk that is within the ordinary knowledge common to the community; and the top-rail alterations proposed by Gish would decrease the safety and utility of the trailer while increasing its cost. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court’s judgment for want of evidence of design defects rendering the trailer unreasonably dangerous in light of its use and purpose. |
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